With all the bad news (or rather reporting and opining about the bad news) regarding vaccine "shortages" it is important to put into perspective how far we have come and how well we are prepared for a highly unpredictable and relatively lethal form of flu. Contrary to the uninformed claims of people like Shannon Brownlee who insist that vaccines will not reduce mortality by 50 percent in high risk populations (only look at averages is misleading and deliberately so Shannon), the vaccine for swine flu delivered to people who need it most, (kids, pregnant women and immune compromised people) will be life saving. And we have a plan that -- like any plan -- will change on contact but will do what it is supposed to do because it has learned from past pandemic response efforts.
The following testimony delivered by Paul Offit in 2006 about how an outbreak of Asian flu was prevented in 1957 provides a perspective on how well we are doing today. Now if only CDC would tell the anti-vaccine and thimerasol scaremongers to go shove it!
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/biodefense.html
PHILADELPHIA
Dr. Offit. Good morning, Senator. My name is Paul Offit. I am Chief of Infectious Diseases at Children's Hospital in Philadelphia and a former member of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices to the CDC.
I would like to talk briefly today about an event that occurred 50 years ago in 1957, the only time in our history that we have made influenza vaccine in advance of a pandemic, because I think there are several lessons that can be learned from that event. On April 17, 1957, Maurice Hilleman, a scientist working at the Walter Reed Army Medical Research Institute, read an article in the New York Times titled ``Hong Kong Battling Influenza Epidemic.'' The article stated that 250,000 people, 10 percent of the entire population of Hong Kong, had suddenly come down with the flu.
Hilleman found that this outbreak signaled--feared that this outbreak signaled the start of the next pandemic. So the next day he sent a telex to the Army's 406th Medical General Laboratory in Zama, Japan, asking them to send him specimens from people infected with the virus. The first specimens arrived 1 month later on May 17, 1957.
For 5 days and nights, Hilleman worked to determine whether the influenza virus circulating in Hong Kong could be a pandemic strain. He tested sera from members of the American military and adults in the general population, but could not find anyone whose immune systems had seen this virus before. Hilleman then sent the virus for testing to the United States Public Health Service, the Commission on Influenza of the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, and the World Health Organization. They found that only a handful of people in the United States and the Netherlands had antibodies to the virus. Because few people in the world had antibodies to stop it, the influenza virus circulating in Hong Kong in 1957 could spread from one country to the next unchecked.
Hilleman then sent the virus, now called Asian flu, to six American-based companies. He figured that if he were to have any chance of saving lives companies would have to make and distribute tens of millions of doses in only 4 months. Hilleman sped up the process by ignoring the Division of Biologic Standards, the Federal agency responsible for regulating vaccines.
He also asked vaccine makers to advise chicken producers not to kill their roosters, even though it was late in the hatching season. He knew that production of tens of millions of doses of vaccine would require at least 200,000 eggs a day.
As predicted, in September 1957 Asian flu entered the United States from both coasts. The first laboratory-proven cases occurred aboard naval vessels in Newport, Rhode Island, and San Diego, California. The first outbreak was triggered by a San Diego girl who carried the virus to an international church conference in Grinnell, Iowa. The second occurred in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.
Companies made the first lots of Asian influenza vaccine in June 1957 and vaccination began in July. By late fall, 40 million doses were distributed in the United States. Within a few months, influenza infected 20 million Americans. 70,000 died from the disease. Worldwide, the pandemic killed at least 4 million people.
The Surgeon General of the United States, Leonard Burney, later said, quote: ``Many millions of persons we can be certain did not contact Asian flu because of the protection of the vaccine.'' For his efforts, Maurice Hilleman won the Distinguished Service Medal from the American military.
Several features of this outbreak and our response to it are instructive. First, Hilleman had to rely on reading an article in a newspaper to know what was happening in Southeast Asia and he had to wait 1 month before he received samples of the virus. Today the international community of scientists, clinicians, and public health officials, armed with sophisticated virological techniques, are much better at surveillance of outbreaks and characterization of possible pandemic strains.
Second, Hilleman called on six U.S.-based influenza vaccine makers. Today no U.S.-based companies make the inactivated vaccine. Sanofi Pasteur has a manufacturing facility in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, but is not a U.S.-based company.
Third, Hilleman had to rely on eggs to produce vaccines. Recognizing that egg production is unreliable, the President's pandemic flu plan has effectively encouraged vaccine makers to gear up facilities to grow influenza virus in mammalian rather than avian cells. For example, GlaxoSmithKline recently purchased a manufacturing facility in Marietta, Pennsylvania, and MedImmune, the makers of a live attenuated influenza vaccine, will manufacture vaccine in mammalian cells in Maryland. Given that the influenza vaccine is generic and inexpensive, it is unlikely that vaccine makers would have done this without financial encouragement.
Fourth, Hilleman completely ignored the Division of Biologic Standards, the Federal agency responsible for regulating vaccines. At the time vaccine regulation was in its infancy, regulated by a small division within the National Institutes of Health. Today vaccines are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration and they do an excellent job. Vaccine regulation I think has helped to make vaccines arguably the safest and best-tested products that we put into our bodies. But the process is slow and if we are to make vaccine quickly the regulatory process would have to be streamlined significantly.
Fifth, Hilleman was a committee of one. He took responsibility for shepherding each step of the process. It would be impossible for him to do that today, but it would certainly be of value for one central agency to be held accountable for making sure that vaccine was made, tested, and distributed quickly and efficiently.
Sixth, Hilleman never considered liability protection for vaccine makers. In 1957 pharmaceutical companies were not held liable if they were not negligent in the production or design of their product. Ironically, the birth of liability without negligence for pharmaceutical companies began with a jury verdict against a vaccine maker, Cutter Laboratories, only a few months later. However, it is clear that vaccine makers would not make a pandemic flu vaccine today without substantial protection from frivolous litigation.
Thanks for giving me an opportunity to speak before this committee.
The following testimony delivered by Paul Offit in 2006 about how an outbreak of Asian flu was prevented in 1957 provides a perspective on how well we are doing today. Now if only CDC would tell the anti-vaccine and thimerasol scaremongers to go shove it!
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/biodefense.html
PHILADELPHIA
Dr. Offit. Good morning, Senator. My name is Paul Offit. I am Chief of Infectious Diseases at Children's Hospital in Philadelphia and a former member of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices to the CDC.
I would like to talk briefly today about an event that occurred 50 years ago in 1957, the only time in our history that we have made influenza vaccine in advance of a pandemic, because I think there are several lessons that can be learned from that event. On April 17, 1957, Maurice Hilleman, a scientist working at the Walter Reed Army Medical Research Institute, read an article in the New York Times titled ``Hong Kong Battling Influenza Epidemic.'' The article stated that 250,000 people, 10 percent of the entire population of Hong Kong, had suddenly come down with the flu.
Hilleman found that this outbreak signaled--feared that this outbreak signaled the start of the next pandemic. So the next day he sent a telex to the Army's 406th Medical General Laboratory in Zama, Japan, asking them to send him specimens from people infected with the virus. The first specimens arrived 1 month later on May 17, 1957.
For 5 days and nights, Hilleman worked to determine whether the influenza virus circulating in Hong Kong could be a pandemic strain. He tested sera from members of the American military and adults in the general population, but could not find anyone whose immune systems had seen this virus before. Hilleman then sent the virus for testing to the United States Public Health Service, the Commission on Influenza of the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, and the World Health Organization. They found that only a handful of people in the United States and the Netherlands had antibodies to the virus. Because few people in the world had antibodies to stop it, the influenza virus circulating in Hong Kong in 1957 could spread from one country to the next unchecked.
Hilleman then sent the virus, now called Asian flu, to six American-based companies. He figured that if he were to have any chance of saving lives companies would have to make and distribute tens of millions of doses in only 4 months. Hilleman sped up the process by ignoring the Division of Biologic Standards, the Federal agency responsible for regulating vaccines.
He also asked vaccine makers to advise chicken producers not to kill their roosters, even though it was late in the hatching season. He knew that production of tens of millions of doses of vaccine would require at least 200,000 eggs a day.
As predicted, in September 1957 Asian flu entered the United States from both coasts. The first laboratory-proven cases occurred aboard naval vessels in Newport, Rhode Island, and San Diego, California. The first outbreak was triggered by a San Diego girl who carried the virus to an international church conference in Grinnell, Iowa. The second occurred in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.
Companies made the first lots of Asian influenza vaccine in June 1957 and vaccination began in July. By late fall, 40 million doses were distributed in the United States. Within a few months, influenza infected 20 million Americans. 70,000 died from the disease. Worldwide, the pandemic killed at least 4 million people.
The Surgeon General of the United States, Leonard Burney, later said, quote: ``Many millions of persons we can be certain did not contact Asian flu because of the protection of the vaccine.'' For his efforts, Maurice Hilleman won the Distinguished Service Medal from the American military.
Several features of this outbreak and our response to it are instructive. First, Hilleman had to rely on reading an article in a newspaper to know what was happening in Southeast Asia and he had to wait 1 month before he received samples of the virus. Today the international community of scientists, clinicians, and public health officials, armed with sophisticated virological techniques, are much better at surveillance of outbreaks and characterization of possible pandemic strains.
Second, Hilleman called on six U.S.-based influenza vaccine makers. Today no U.S.-based companies make the inactivated vaccine. Sanofi Pasteur has a manufacturing facility in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, but is not a U.S.-based company.
Third, Hilleman had to rely on eggs to produce vaccines. Recognizing that egg production is unreliable, the President's pandemic flu plan has effectively encouraged vaccine makers to gear up facilities to grow influenza virus in mammalian rather than avian cells. For example, GlaxoSmithKline recently purchased a manufacturing facility in Marietta, Pennsylvania, and MedImmune, the makers of a live attenuated influenza vaccine, will manufacture vaccine in mammalian cells in Maryland. Given that the influenza vaccine is generic and inexpensive, it is unlikely that vaccine makers would have done this without financial encouragement.
Fourth, Hilleman completely ignored the Division of Biologic Standards, the Federal agency responsible for regulating vaccines. At the time vaccine regulation was in its infancy, regulated by a small division within the National Institutes of Health. Today vaccines are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration and they do an excellent job. Vaccine regulation I think has helped to make vaccines arguably the safest and best-tested products that we put into our bodies. But the process is slow and if we are to make vaccine quickly the regulatory process would have to be streamlined significantly.
Fifth, Hilleman was a committee of one. He took responsibility for shepherding each step of the process. It would be impossible for him to do that today, but it would certainly be of value for one central agency to be held accountable for making sure that vaccine was made, tested, and distributed quickly and efficiently.
Sixth, Hilleman never considered liability protection for vaccine makers. In 1957 pharmaceutical companies were not held liable if they were not negligent in the production or design of their product. Ironically, the birth of liability without negligence for pharmaceutical companies began with a jury verdict against a vaccine maker, Cutter Laboratories, only a few months later. However, it is clear that vaccine makers would not make a pandemic flu vaccine today without substantial protection from frivolous litigation.
Thanks for giving me an opportunity to speak before this committee.
